Geopolitical Priorities and National Interests

 1. Geopolitical Priorities and National Interests

Muslim-majority countries, like any others, prioritize their national interests, which often take precedence over collective solidarity with Gaza. These interests include economic stability, regional security, and maintaining favorable relations with global powers, particularly the United States and its allies, who are key supporters of Israel.

( Normalization with Israel )The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have normalized relations with Israel via the Abraham Accords (2020) or previous agreements (e.g., Egypt in 1979, Jordan in 1994). These alignments bring economic, military, and technological advantages, which administrations do not want to risk jeopardizing by adopting strong anti-Israel positions. For instance, the UAE has emphasized its condemnation of Hamas’s actions rather than Israel’s military operations, reflecting its diplomatic alignment

( Competition with Iran )Most Sunni-majority Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, perceive Iran as a more strategic threat than Israel. Iran's backing of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis produces a regional divide. Backing Gaza, where Hamas is active, may unintentionally enhance Iran's influence, which these nations aim to oppose.

- **Dependence on Western Powers**: Nations such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia depend considerably on U.S. military and economic support. Egypt alone receives around $1.3 billion a year in U.S. military aid, with Jordan receiving the same. Taking steps against Israel, such as applying sanctions or severing diplomatic relations, could risk offending the U.S., which may destabilize these regimes politically or economically

The Palestinian issue, and Gaza especially, speaks strongly to Arab and Muslim masses, frequently more so than to their political leaderships. Yet such mass sentiment can imperil regime stability, particularly in nonliberal regimes.

- **Deterrence of Pro-Palestinian Activism**: Governments worry that the permitment of large-scale protests or popular movements in favor of Gaza can degenerate into larger anti-government protests, like the Arab Spring (2010–2011). States such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan have suppressed pro-Palestine activism to avert such events. For instance, Saudi Arabia has banned public demonstrations, seeing them as posing a possible challenge to regime legitimacy

- **Historical Context**: The issue of the Palestinians has consistently been manipulated by opposition forces, e.g., left-wing movements in the 1950s and Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood recently, to oppose governing elites. Governments do not like any cause likely to unite opposition and are thus wary of rallying support for Gaza.

- **Public Sentiment Immobilization**: Arab regimes are caught in a dilemma: military or diplomatic support for Gaza risks confrontation with Israel and its Western allies, while doing nothing provokes local criticism for being complicit in Israel's aggression. This engenders political immobility whereby regimes resort to rhetorical denunciation rather than taking meaningful action.[](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-states-have-supported-and-shunned-hamas-in-the-gaza-war/)

### 3. Economic and Social Vulnerabilities

Several Muslim-majority states are confronted by internal issues which restrict their will or capacity to participate in the Gaza conflict.

- **Economic Restraints**: Egypt and Jordan, among other countries, have serious economic constraints, such as high debt, unemployment, and dependence on foreign aid. Egypt, for example, has a weak economy and cannot accommodate more burdens, like taking in Gaza refugees or heightening tensions with Israel. Gulf states, although richer, focus on economic diversification (e.g., Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030) rather than regional conflicts that might interfere with investments.

- **Social Weakness**: The decline of organized civil society in most Arab countries, especially following the repression of organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (labeled a terrorist group by Egypt and others in 2014), has lowered the potential for grassroots mobilization. Without effective societal actors to put pressure on governments, popular support for Gaza is loud but useless.

- **Refugee Concerns**: Egypt and Jordan, bordering Gaza and the West Bank, are especially hesitant to take in refugees from Gaza for fear of long-term political and demographic implications. Egypt, for instance, has publicly announced it will not permit Gaza's residents to be displaced onto its land in reference to the 1948 Nakba, when Palestinian refugees were left permanently displaced. Jordan, with its large Palestinian population, is afraid additional demographic changes will destabilize its monarchy

### 4. Hamas as a Divisive Force

Hamas, the Islamist movement that rules Gaza since 2007, is a key reason why most Muslim-majority nations have been hesitant to provide strong support.

- **Ideological and Political Divide**: Hamas is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is considered a threat by most Arab governments, especially Egypt and the UAE. They worry that backing Gaza under Hamas's rule might encourage similar Islamist forces within their countries. Egypt, for example, has labeled Hamas a terrorist organization and has kept a blockade on Gaza together with Israel to contain its influence.

- **Regional Alignment**: Hamas's alignment with Iran, Qatar, and Turkey puts it at odds with other Muslim-majority countries. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for instance, are hesitant to support a group supported by their regional competitors. This makes any cohesive Muslim response to Gaza splinter

- **Denunciation of Hamas's Actions**: Certain states, including Bahrain, have openly denounced Hamas's actions, including the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, which resulted in the deaths of almost 1,200 individuals and the capture of more than 200 hostages. This is consistent with their overall diplomatic approaches and lowers their willingness to assist Gaza under Hamas rule.[](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_reactions_to_the_Gaza_war)

### 5. Limited Military Capability and Nuclear Deterrence

The military imbalance between Israel and most Muslim nations, as well as Israel's nuclear capabilities, serves as a deterrent to immediate intervention.

- **Israel's Military Capability**: Israel's high-tech military, supported by the U.S., is a force to be reckoned with. Very few Muslim-majority nations can compete with it in direct combat. Non-state players such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis have fought against Israel, but state players are afraid because of the fear of a disastrous retaliation

- **Nuclear Deterrence**: Israel's undeclared but generally accepted nuclear weapons act as an effective deterrent. Certain analyses imply that Muslim states do not engage in escalation partly due to this threat, since confrontation would have devastating repercussions.

- **Shortage of Unified Military Strategy**: There is no cohesive military alliance of Muslim-majority nations, similar to NATO, which restricts their capacity to organize any concerted response. Previous efforts, such as the Arab League's military campaigns in 1948 or 1967, were defeated, further deterring such an endeavor.

### 6. Rhetorical Support vs. Substantive Action

While most Muslim-majority states have been in the dock on charges of action being limited, their actions too are mostly confined to rhetoric, humanitarian assistance, or diplomatic forays because of the limitations articulated above.

- **Diplomatic Condemnations**: On occasions such as the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference in Riyadh on November 11, 2023, leaders universally criticized Israel's operations in Gaza and demanded a ceasefire. These messages never find action in the form of sanctions or cutting ties with Israel

- **Humanitarian Aid**: Humanitarian aid has come to Gaza from countries such as Qatar, Turkey, and Jordan. For instance, the International Rescue Committee, in cooperation with Palestinian NGOs, has distributed medical supplies and food aid, which has usually been paid for by Gulf states. But this aid is curtailed by Israel's access restrictions and Egypt's blockade.[](https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-middle-east-what-happening)

- **Alternative Proposals**: A few states have supported diplomatic proposals, including Egypt's $53 billion Gaza reconstruction proposal, endorsed by the Arab League and OIC in March 2025. The proposal has an emphasis on reconstruction and state-building but eschews confrontation with Israel, demonstrating a desire for post-conflict stabilization over proactive engagement.

7. Historical and Cultural Shifts

Historical losses and shifting political identities have diminished the primacy of the Palestinian issue in certain Muslim-majority nations.

- **Post-1967 Disillusionment**: The Arab defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, which resulted in Israel's occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, was a turning point. The defeat discredited pan-Arab nationalism, spearheaded by leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, and moved attention towards state-centric policies. This undermined collective Arab solidarity with Palestine.

- **De-Arabization Narrative**: Post-1967 U.S. foreign policy focused on "de-Arabization," urging Arab nations to place Western-aligned interests ahead of regional solidarity. This has caused some regimes to see the Palestinian cause as an obstacle to economic growth and regional stability.

- **Changing Identities**: Traditional pan-Arab and Islamic identities that previously united support for Palestine have eroded in favor of national (wataniyyah) or local (baladiyyah) identities. This process lessens the emotional and political drive for action among governments and the people.

### 8. Exceptions and Nuances

Although the general pattern indicates minimal support, some Muslim-majority nations and actors have made significant efforts, albeit bounded by their own limitations.

- **Turkey and Qatar**: Both nations have been major backers of Gaza with financial and political aid, accommodating Hamas leaders and brokering ceasefire talks. Their efforts tend to be described as inadequate vis-a-vis expectations, emphasizing diplomacy over direct intervention.

- **Iran and Non-State Actors**: Iran sponsors Hamas and other groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis with weapons and training. This sponsorship, however, tends to be strategic, used against Israel and Sunni Arab regimes and not necessarily altruistic. Non-state actors such as Hezbollah have fought militarily against Israel and gained ceasefires and prisoner exchanges, but state actors are not so bold.

- **Public vs. Government Divide**: In most nations, the public overwhelmingly sympathizes with Gaza, as evidenced by demonstrations throughout the region. But authoritarian governments repress these efforts to keep them in power, causing a divergence between citizens and their governments

9. Critical Perspective: Beyond the Narrative

The narrative of "Muslim countries not supporting Gaza" must be nuanced. Support is country-specific, context-specific, and capability-specific. Although direct political or military intervention is unusual, it does not mean indifference. Most states are truly constrained, and their responses—albeit circumscribed—are influenced by an intricate balance of survival, strategy, and domestic considerations. In contrast, the expectation of mobilized Muslim support perhaps overestimates the unity of the "Muslim world," which has as many divisions as interests. The emphasis on state inaction also threatens to overshadow the actions of non-state actors, NGOs, and individuals who continue to speak up for Gaza.

### Conclusion

Muslim-majority nations' lukewarm support for Gaza is due to a mix of geopolitical interests, fear of domestic instability, economic weaknesses, and the polarizing influence of Hamas. While some offer humanitarian assistance or diplomatic backing, most value national interests, regional competition, and stability above direct intervention. Historical transformations, military asymmetries, and Israel's nuclear deterrent also limit action. Public emotion in support of Gaza is tempered by dictatorial regimes suppressing activism to hold power, leaving a disconnect between rhetoric and action. To understand such dynamics, one must appreciate the heterogeneity of the Muslim world and the pragmatic calculations underpinning state behavior.